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Negotiating over small bundles of resources

Chevaleyre, Yann; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jérôme; Maudet, Nicolas (2005), Negotiating over small bundles of resources, in Wooldridge, Michael, 4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2005), July 25-29, 2005, Utrecht, The Netherlands, ACM, p. 296-302

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Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2005
Conference country
NETHERLANDS
Book title
4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2005), July 25-29, 2005, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Book author
Wooldridge, Michael
Publisher
ACM
ISBN
1-59593-094-9
Pages
296-302
Metadata
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Author(s)
Chevaleyre, Yann
Endriss, Ulle
Lang, Jérôme
Maudet, Nicolas cc
Abstract (EN)
When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from convergingto a socially optimal allocation in the general case. This paper addresses this issue by analysing how the confinement tocertain classes of utility functions can enable agents to moveto an optimal allocation by negotiating over small bundlesof items at a time. In particular, we consider so-called k-separable domains, where the full set of resources can bedivided into several preferentially independent bundles oflimited cardinality.
Subjects / Keywords
Utility theory; Multiagent resource allocation; Social choice and welfare; Negotiation
JEL
D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost–Benefit Analysis