• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

The role of fixed cost in international environmental negotiations

Jacques, Jean-François; Bayramoglu, Basak (2011), The role of fixed cost in international environmental negotiations, Environment and Development Economics, 16, 2, p. 221-238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X10000501

View/Open
fixed_cost.PDF (255.0Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2011
Journal name
Environment and Development Economics
Volume
16
Number
2
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Pages
221-238
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X10000501
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Jacques, Jean-François
Bayramoglu, Basak
Abstract (EN)
We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are examined: the Nash bargaining solution, involving two countries, and the coalition formation framework, involving numerous countries and emphasizing self-enforcing agreements. In the former, in terms of welfare, strictly identical countries may wish to reduce their emissions in a non-uniform way under the differentiated agreement. For this result to hold, the fixed cost of investment in abatement technology must be sufficiently high. The nature of the threat point of negotiations, however, also plays a crucial role. As concerns global abatement, the two countries abate more under the uniform agreement than under the differentiated one. In terms of coalition formation when numerous countries are involved, a grand coalition could emerge under a differentiated agreement.
Subjects / Keywords
bargaining; standards; costs; Transboundary pollution
JEL
Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Q58 - Government Policy
F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
C71 - Cooperative Games

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers 
    Bayramoglu, Basak; Jacques, Jean-François (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    International negotiations on the environment : Uniform vs. differentiated standards 
    Bayramoglu, Basak; Jacques, Jean-François (2012) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Environmental big push 
    Bayramoglu, Basak; Jacques, Jean-François (2009-07) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Les négociations internationales sur l’environnement : norme uniforme et normes différenciées 
    Jacques, Jean-François; Bayramoglu, Basak (2012-11) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Low wages and high unemployment rates : The role of social interactions in hiring discrimination 
    Jacques, Jean-François; Walkowiak, Emmanuelle (2009) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo