Adverse selection in health insurance : are first best contracts impossible

dc.contributor.author	Alary, David
dc.contributor.author	Bien, Franck
dc.date.accessioned	2011-04-08T14:23:03Z
dc.date.available	2011-04-08T14:23:03Z
dc.date.issued	2005
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5961
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Adverse Selection	en
dc.subject	Health insurance	en
dc.subject	bivariate utility function	en
dc.subject	health status	en
dc.subject	optimal contract	en
dc.subject.ddc	334	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	D82	en
dc.title	Adverse selection in health insurance : are first best contracts impossible	en
dc.type	Document de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstracten	In this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is suﬃciently reduced by illness.	en
dc.publisher.name	Université Paris-Dauphine
dc.publisher.city	Paris
dc.identifier.citationpages	9	en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitle	Cahiers de recherche d'EURISCO	en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber	2005-16	en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate	oui	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Economie sociale	en

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