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dc.contributor.authorAlary, David
dc.contributor.authorBien, Franck
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-08T14:23:03Z
dc.date.available2011-04-08T14:23:03Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5961
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAdverse Selectionen
dc.subjectHealth insuranceen
dc.subjectbivariate utility functionen
dc.subjecthealth statusen
dc.subjectoptimal contracten
dc.subject.ddc334en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.titleAdverse selection in health insurance : are first best contracts impossibleen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenIn this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is sufficiently reduced by illness.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphine
dc.publisher.cityParis
dc.identifier.citationpages9en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers de recherche d'EURISCOen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber2005-16en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie socialeen


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