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Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Tomala, Tristan (2009), Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 2, p. 682-694. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2009
Journal name
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
67
Number
2
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
682-694
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Tomala, Tristan
Abstract (EN)
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
Subjects / Keywords
Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring; Communication equilibria
JEL
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games