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Learning Sets in State Dependent Signalling Game Forms: A Characterization

Renault, Jérôme (2001), Learning Sets in State Dependent Signalling Game Forms: A Characterization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 26, 4, p. 832-850. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.26.4.832.10005

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2001
Journal name
Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume
26
Number
4
Publisher
Informs
Pages
832-850
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.26.4.832.10005
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Abstract (EN)
We consider repeated game forms with incomplete information and state dependent signalling structure. We study the information a player can learn about the state of nature through a communication procedure, in a way robust to unilateral deviations. More precisely, we say that player i can distinguish state {omega} from state {omega}' if there exists a strategy profile such that if {omega} is the true state and at most one player deviates from the profile, then player i will know after a finite number of stages that {omega}' is not the true state. The learning set of player i at {omega} is the set of states that player i cannot distinguish from {omega}. It corresponds to the information player i can learn, in a way immune against unilateral deviations, if the state is {omega} and players communicate through the game form for a finite number of stages. This notion was introduced in a joint paper with T. Tomala (Renault and Tomala 2000). We provide here a general characterization of the learning sets.
Subjects / Keywords
Repeated games; signalling; learning set
JEL
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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