Nonparametric Adverse Selection Problems
Carlier, Guillaume (2002), Nonparametric Adverse Selection Problems, Annals of Operations Research, 114, 1-4, p. 71-82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021001917492
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameAnnals of Operations Research
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Abstract (EN)This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a whole utility function and cannot be reduced to some finite-dimensional parameter. In this case, incentive-compatibility conditions can be conveniently expressed using some abstract convexity notions arising for instance in Mass Transfer Theory. After this characterization is provided, an existence result of optimal incentive-compatible contracts is proved. Finally, several economic examples are considered including applications to regulation and labor contracting.
Subjects / Keywordsprincipal-agent problems; contract theory; abstract convex analysis
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