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Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation

Gossner, Olivier (1998), Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation, Journal of Economic Theory, 83, 1, p. 69-89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2444

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
1998
Journal name
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
83
Number
1
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
69-89
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2444
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Gossner, Olivier
Abstract (EN)
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.
Subjects / Keywords
communication; information; equilibria
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games

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