
Labor Contracts With Two-Dimensional Adverse Selection
Carlier, Guillaume; Gaumont, Damien (2000), Labor Contracts With Two-Dimensional Adverse Selection. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6245
Type
Document de travail / Working paperDate
2000Publisher
Université Paris-Dauphine
Series title
Cahiers du CEREMADESeries number
2000-22Published in
Paris
Pages
20
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We study incentive-compatible labor contracts in the case where both individual productivity and subjective discount rate are unobservable by the rm. We rst show that unidimensional manifolds of agents group on the same contract. High , low agents may choose the same contract as low , high agents. We show existence and uniqueness of an optimal wage function which is continuous and unbounded. This optimal wage function can be determined by the ironing procedure.Subjects / Keywords
Adverse Selection; Incentive-Compatible Contracts; Ironing Procedure; Heterogeneous Time PreferenceRelated items
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