Strategic learning in games with symmetric information
Gossner, Olivier; Vieille, Nicolas (2003), Strategic learning in games with symmetric information, Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 1, p. 25-47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameGames and Economic Behavior
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.
Subjects / KeywordsPublic value of information; Games with incomplete information; Bandit problems
Showing items related by title and author.