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A minority game with bounded recall

Renault, Jérôme; Scarsini, Marco; Tomala, Tristan (2007), A minority game with bounded recall, Mathematics of Operations Research, 32, 4, p. 873-889. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0284

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2007
Journal name
Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume
32
Number
4
Publisher
INFORMS
Pages
873-889
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0284
Metadata
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Author(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Scarsini, Marco
Tomala, Tristan
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.
Subjects / Keywords
folk theorem; de Bruijn sequence; imperfect monitoring; uniform equilibrium; public equilibrium; private equilibrium
JEL
C44 - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory

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