
A minority game with bounded recall
Renault, Jérôme; Scarsini, Marco; Tomala, Tristan (2007), A minority game with bounded recall, Mathematics of Operations Research, 32, 4, p. 873-889. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0284
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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2007Journal name
Mathematics of Operations ResearchVolume
32Number
4Publisher
INFORMS
Pages
873-889
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.Subjects / Keywords
folk theorem; de Bruijn sequence; imperfect monitoring; uniform equilibrium; public equilibrium; private equilibriumRelated items
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