Aggregation Problems and Models: What Comes First?
Pigozzi, Gabriella (2010), Aggregation Problems and Models: What Comes First?, in Stadler, Friedrich, The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science, Springer : Berlin, p. 141-152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_11
Book titleThe Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science
Book authorStadler, Friedrich
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn attention in law, philosophy, economics and computer science. Despite the apparent simplicity of the problem, reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure a consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation has been influenced by earlier work in social choice theory. As preference aggregation investigated in social choice theory, judgment aggregation studies aggregation functions under specific conditions. These are derived from properties of the preference aggregation realm. In this paper we argue that judgment aggregation problems are intrinsically different from preference aggregation ones. Thus, imposing exogenous models and properties is detrimental to a deep understanding of the specificity of judgment aggregation.
Subjects / Keywordsaggregation methods; individual judgments; collective judgment; aggregation problems
Showing items related by title and author.
Lang, Jérôme; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Slavkovik, Marija; van der Torre, Leendert; Vesic, Srdjan (2017) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Butler, George; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Rouchier, Juliette (2019) Article accepté pour publication ou publié