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dc.contributor.authorDragicevic, Arnaud
dc.contributor.authorEttinger, David
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08T09:02:24Z
dc.date.available2011-06-08T09:02:24Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6445
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectauction mechanismsen
dc.subjectWTP-WTA disparityen
dc.subjectprivate provisionsen
dc.subjectpublic goodsen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ53en
dc.subject.classificationjelC91en
dc.subject.classificationjelD44en
dc.titlePrivate Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanismsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms – the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA) – in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence towards equality of welfare indices. We also observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from their public good funding.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Benefit-Cost Analysis
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol2
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpagesart. 4
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.2202/2152-2812.1064
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherBerkeley Electronic Press
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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