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Optimal health insurance contract : can moral hazard increase indemnity ?

Bien, Franck; Alary, David (2006), Optimal health insurance contract : can moral hazard increase indemnity ?, 33th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economics, 2006-09, Barcelone, Espagne

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Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2006
Conference title
33th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economics
Conference date
2006-09
Conference city
Barcelone
Conference country
Espagne
Pages
6
Metadata
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Author(s)
Bien, Franck
Alary, David
Abstract (EN)
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal coverage and the optimal preventive effort are higher than with perfect information.
Subjects / Keywords
Moral hazard; Health insurance; bivariate utility function; health status; optimal contract
JEL
I19 - Other
G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design