
Optimal health insurance contract : can moral hazard increase indemnity ?
Bien, Franck; Alary, David (2006), Optimal health insurance contract : can moral hazard increase indemnity ?, 33th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economics, 2006-09, Barcelone, Espagne
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Type
Communication / ConférenceDate
2006Conference title
33th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance EconomicsConference date
2006-09Conference city
BarceloneConference country
EspagnePages
6
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal coverage and the optimal preventive effort are higher than with perfect information.Subjects / Keywords
Moral hazard; Health insurance; bivariate utility function; health status; optimal contractRelated items
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Alary, David; Bien, Franck (2007) Document de travail / Working paper
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Bien, Franck; Alary, David (2007) Communication / Conférence
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Gollier, Christian; Alary, David (2004-11) Article accepté pour publication ou publié