3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side
Renault, Jérôme (2001), 3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side, International Journal of Game Theory, 30, 2, p. 221-245. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820100076
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameInternational Journal of Game Theory
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Abstract (EN)We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.
Subjects / Keywordsrepeated games; incomplete information; lack of information on one side; 3 players; uniform equilibrium; existence of equilibria
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