Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Gossner, Olivier; Tomala, Tristan (2003), Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6885
TypeDocument de travail / Working paper
Series titleCahiers du Ceremade
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)We characterize the minmax values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-oﬀ for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoﬀs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are measured through the entropy function. Our theorem on minmax values stems from a more general characterization of optimal strategies for a class of optimization problems.
Subjects / Keywordscorrelation; optimization problem; min-max values; repeated games
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