Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes
Xia, Lirong; Conitzer, Vincent; Lang, Jérôme (2011), Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes, in Shoham, Yohav, Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), San Jose, CA, USA, June 5-9, 2011, ACM, p. 179-188
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Conference countryUNITED STATES
Book titleProceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), San Jose, CA, USA, June 5-9, 2011
Book authorShoham, Yohav
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)In many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multipleissues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model sequential voting in multi-issue domains as a complete-informationextensive-form game, in which the agents are perfectly rational and their preferences are common knowledge. In each step, the voters simultaneously vote on oneissue, and the order of the issues is determined before the process. We call thismodel strategic sequential voting.We focus on domains with binary issues, so that this process leads to a uniqueoutcome under a natural solution concept. We show several multiple-election paradoxes in strategic sequential voting: there exists a proﬁle for which the winnerunder strategic sequential voting is ranked nearly at the bottom in all votes, and thewinner is Pareto-dominated by almost every other alternative. We also show thatchanging the order of the issues cannot completely prevent such paradoxes. Wealso study paradoxes for strategic sequential voting in which the proﬁles satisfy domain restrictions such as separability, lexicographicity or O -legality. Finally, westudy other common voting rules (from a non-strategic perspective). For some ofthem, we show that there exist paradoxes that are similar to the multiple-electionparadoxes, and for the others, we show that there are no such paradoxes.
Subjects / Keywordspreferences; voting
Showing items related by title and author.