A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment

Dominiak, Adam; Dürsch, Peter; Lefort, Jean-Philippe

Dominiak, Adam; Dürsch, Peter; Lefort, Jean-Philippe (2012), A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment, Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 2, p. 625-638. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.002

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Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2012

Journal name

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

Number

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

625-638

Abstract (EN)

Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin behaviorally the link between conditional and unconditional preferences. To test the descriptive validity of these rationality concepts, we conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsbergʼs 3-color experiment. We find that more subjects act in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects.

Subjects / Keywords

dynamic consistency; updating; ambiguity; Non expected utility preferences; experiment; consequentialism

JEL

D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior