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dc.contributor.authorde La Bruslerie, Hubert
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-09T13:23:31Z
dc.date.available2011-11-09T13:23:31Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7428
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectMeans of paymenten
dc.subjectTakeover premiumen
dc.subjectContract settingen
dc.subjectM&Aen
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelG32en
dc.subject.classificationjelG34en
dc.titleCrossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: Empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactionsen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenAnalysis of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done separately. In the empirical literature these two variables are often considered independently although they may have endogenous relation in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums will yield payments with more cash. We highlight that the payment choice is not a continuum between full cash and full share payment. Two different regimes of payment in M&A transactions are empirically characterized. We analyze the major determinants of M&A terms when the offer premium and the means of payment are jointly set. The underlying rationale of asymmetry of information and risk sharing calculus is found significant in the setting of the agreement.en
dc.identifier.citationpages50en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelOrganisation et finances d'entrepriseen
dc.relation.conftitle10ème Conférence Internationale de Gouvernance
dc.relation.confdate2011-05
dc.relation.confcityMontréal
dc.relation.confcountryCanada


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