
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
Renou, Ludovic; Carlier, Guillaume (2006), Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example, Economic Theory, 28, 2, p. 461-473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0632-7
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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2006Journal name
Economic TheoryVolume
28Number
2Publisher
Springer
Pages
461-473
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.Subjects / Keywords
Debt contracts; Diversity of opinions; Screening; Costly monitoring; PoolingRelated items
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