Committees as Substitutes for Commitment
Riboni, Alessandro (2010), Committees as Substitutes for Commitment, International Economic Review, 51, 1, p. 213-236. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00577.x
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameInternational Economic Review
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Abstract (EN)In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating example, this article focuses on the time consistency of monetary policy.
Subjects / KeywordsTime Consistency Problems; Dynamic voting; Committees
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