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dc.contributor.authorRiboni, Alessandro
dc.contributor.authorRuge-Murcia, Francesco
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05T10:19:33Z
dc.date.available2011-12-05T10:19:33Z
dc.date.issued2011-05
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7718
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCommitteesen
dc.subjectvoting modelsen
dc.subjectpolitical economy of central bankingen
dc.subject.ddc339en
dc.subject.classificationjelE5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD7en
dc.titleDissent in Monetary Policy Decisionsen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherDepartment of Economics, University of Montreal;Canada
dc.description.abstractenVoting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The eff ect of institutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well.en
dc.publisher.nameRimini Centre for Economic Analysisen
dc.publisher.cityRiminien
dc.identifier.citationpages36en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleWP 11-27en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelMacroéconomieen


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