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Ideology and endogenous constitutions

dc.contributor.authorRiboni, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05T12:21:01Z
dc.date.available2011-12-05T12:21:01Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7723
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectMajority ruleen
dc.subjectPosition-taking preferencesen
dc.subjectIdeological polarizationen
dc.subjectStrategic interactionsen
dc.subjectAgenda-setting gameen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD7en
dc.subject.classificationjelD02en
dc.titleIdeology and endogenous constitutionsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol52
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2013
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages885-913
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0668-9en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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