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dc.contributor.authorGrislain-Letrémy, Céline
dc.contributor.authorVilleneuve, Bertrand
HAL ID: 745441
ORCID: 0000-0001-7485-9262
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-09T11:06:46Z
dc.date.available2012-01-09T11:06:46Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7845
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectnatural disastersen
dc.subjectindustrial disastersen
dc.subjectinsuranceen
dc.subjectland use regulationen
dc.subjecthazard mapsen
dc.subject.ddc333en
dc.subject.classificationjelQ54en
dc.subject.classificationjelR52en
dc.subject.classificationjelG22en
dc.subject.classificationjelH23en
dc.titleNatural and Industrial Disasters : Land Use and Insuranceen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenUrbanization in exposed areas increases the cost of disasters. For industrial risks, potential victims raise firms’ liabilities. For natural risks, overexposure by some undermines mutualization. Land use policy (particularly exclusion zones) and insurance shape urbanization, but their efficiency is limited by hazard-map precision. Map-based discrimination being politically sensitive, we identify an operation of map redrawing that increases the welfare of all. Climate change and population growth increase risk. We exhibit realistic cases where exclusion zones shrink as risk rises. We disentangle the competing effects at play. Results are established for alternative distributions of bargaining power between households, mayor and firm.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphineen
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages29en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers de la Chaire Finance et Développement Durable
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber45
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie de la terre et des ressources naturellesen


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