• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?

Geoffron, Patrice; Wang, Haobo (2008), What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?, International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 1, 1, p. 58-79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJMNE.2008.018680

View/Open
Geoffron.Wang.pdf (1.297Mb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2008
Journal name
International Journal of Management and Network Economics
Volume
1
Number
1
Publisher
Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Pages
58-79
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJMNE.2008.018680
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Geoffron, Patrice
Wang, Haobo
Abstract (EN)
The aim of our paper is to determine the efficiency of the asymmetric regulation of the Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs) in a market where the firms are differentiated in size and with commercial offers that include calling club effects. Major regulatory issues are related to these analyses, since some European National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and the European Commission tend to question asymmetric regulation mechanisms. Based on a model designed to determine firm profits and consumer surplus, our main results are as follows. The asymmetric regulation of the MTRs may contribute to an increase in welfare. If the impact is neutral regarding the firms (a simple reallocation of profits from the large to the small player), the consumer surplus is increased. The appropriate way to proceed is to decrease the large firm’s MTRs rather than increasing the smaller firm’s ones, which could produce negative side effects. From a dynamic point of view, the appropriate asymmetric regulation may contribute to balancing market shares and, in such a way, compensate for first-mover advantages.
Subjects / Keywords
Economics of telecommunications; Regulation; Networks; Mobile Termination Rates
JEL
L96 - Telecommunications
K29 - Other

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Is the SES of patients relevant for physicians? What are the effects on medical practice? The case of overweight treatment 
    Dourgnon, Paul; Afrite, Anissa (2013) Document de travail / Working paper
  • Thumbnail
    Competition and regulation with asymmetries in mobile markets 
    Geoffron, Patrice; Benzoni, Laurent (2007) Ouvrage
  • Thumbnail
    Turning the Mobile Multimedia Offer into an Ecosystem : The Nippon-Korean Pattern 
    Eliezer, Estelle-Sarah; Geoffron, Patrice; Benzoni, Laurent (2003) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Infrastructure-based versus service-based competition in the European mobile markets 
    Geoffron, Patrice (2007) Chapitre d'ouvrage
  • Thumbnail
    Infrastructure versus service-based competition : the case of mobile telecommunications 
    Benzoni, Laurent; Geoffron, Patrice (2008) Ouvrage
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo