Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known
Dana, Rose-Anne; Carlier, Guillaume (2013), Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known, Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 4, p. 1606-1623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2013Journal name
Journal of Economic TheoryVolume
148Number
4Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
1606-1623
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions.Subjects / Keywords
Incomplete preferences; Pareto optima and equilibria; efficient equilibria; efficient allocationsRelated items
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