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Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known

Dana, Rose-Anne; Carlier, Guillaume (2013), Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known, Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 4, p. 1606-1623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2013
Journal name
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
148
Number
4
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
1606-1623
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Dana, Rose-Anne
Carlier, Guillaume
Abstract (EN)
An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions.
Subjects / Keywords
Incomplete preferences; Pareto optima and equilibria; efficient equilibria; efficient allocations
JEL
D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost–Benefit Analysis
D6 - Welfare Economics