Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known

Dana, Rose-Anne; Carlier, Guillaume

Dana, Rose-Anne; Carlier, Guillaume (2013), Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known, Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 4, p. 1606-1623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2013

Nom de la revue

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

148

Numéro

Éditeur

Elsevier

Pages

1606-1623

Résumé (EN)

An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions.