
Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, 8, 1, p. 95-123. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE944
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Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2013-01Journal name
Theoretical EconomicsVolume
8Number
1Publisher
Society for Economic Theory
Pages
95-123
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Show full item recordAbstract (EN)
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.Subjects / Keywords
Bayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two PlayerRelated items
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