Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case

Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter

Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, 8, 1, p. 95-123. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE944

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Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2013-01

Journal name

Theoretical Economics

Volume

Number

Publisher

Society for Economic Theory

Pages

95-123

Abstract (EN)

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.

Subjects / Keywords

Bayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two Player

JEL

C72 - Noncooperative Games
D70 - General
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games