Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, 8, 1, p. 95-123. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE944
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameTheoretical Economics
Society for Economic Theory
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Abstract (EN)We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.
Subjects / KeywordsBayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two Player
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