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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case

Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, 8, 1, p. 95-123. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE944

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2013-01
Journal name
Theoretical Economics
Volume
8
Number
1
Publisher
Society for Economic Theory
Pages
95-123
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE944
Metadata
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Vida, Péter
Abstract (EN)
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.
Subjects / Keywords
Bayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two Player
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D70 - General
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

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