Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion
Elkind, Edith; Lang, Jérôme; Saffidine, Abdallah (2011), Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion, in Walsh, Toby, Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI11), AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, p. 186-191
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Book titleProceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI11)
Book authorWalsh, Toby
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)In elections, an alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist o f alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where in stead of domination by a majority of voters we require domination by a given fractio n θ of voters; we refer to this concept as θ winning set. We explore social choice-theoretic and algorithmica spects of these solution concepts, both theoretically and empirically.
Subjects / KeywordsCondorcet winner; Condorcet criterion; voting
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Baumeister, Dorothea; Bouveret, Sylvain; Lang, Jérôme; Nguyen, Trung Thanh; Rothe, Jörg; Saffidine, Abdallah (2017) Article accepté pour publication ou publié