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"Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguity

Lefort, Jean-Philippe; Dominiak, Adam (2011-01), "Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguity, TARK XIII : Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, ACM : New York, p. 35

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K_Agreement_under_Ambiguity_16_8.pdf (349.0Kb)
Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2011-01
Conference title
TARK XIII
Conference date
2011-07
Conference city
Groningen
Conference country
Pays-Bas
Book title
TARK XIII : Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Publisher
ACM
Published in
New York
ISBN
978-1-4503-0707-9
Pages
35
Metadata
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Author(s)
Lefort, Jean-Philippe
Dominiak, Adam
Abstract (EN)
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by capacities. It is shown that, if each agent's information partition is made up of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (1999, Mat. Soc. Sci. 38, 197-213), then it is impossible that the agents disagree on their commonly known decisions, whatever these decisions are : whether posterior beliefs or conditional expectations. Conversely, an agreement on conditional expectations, but not on posterior beliefs, implies that agents' private information must consist of Nehring-unambiguous events. The results obtained allow to attribute the existence of a speculative trade to the presence of agents' diverse and ambiguous information.
Subjects / Keywords
capacities; Ambiguity; No-Trade Theorem; Choquet expected utility theory; unambiguous events; Agreement Theorem; common knowledge; asymmetric information
JEL
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D70 - General

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