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"Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguity

dc.contributor.authorLefort, Jean-Philippe
dc.contributor.authorDominiak, Adam
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-26T07:38:26Z
dc.date.available2012-03-26T07:38:26Z
dc.date.issued2011-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/8575
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectcapacitiesen
dc.subjectAmbiguityen
dc.subjectNo-Trade Theoremen
dc.subjectChoquet expected utility theoryen
dc.subjectunambiguous eventsen
dc.subjectAgreement Theoremen
dc.subjectcommon knowledgeen
dc.subjectasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD81en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD70
dc.title"Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguityen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherDepartment of Economics, University of Heidelberg;Allemagne
dc.description.abstractenIn this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by capacities. It is shown that, if each agent's information partition is made up of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (1999, Mat. Soc. Sci. 38, 197-213), then it is impossible that the agents disagree on their commonly known decisions, whatever these decisions are : whether posterior beliefs or conditional expectations. Conversely, an agreement on conditional expectations, but not on posterior beliefs, implies that agents' private information must consist of Nehring-unambiguous events. The results obtained allow to attribute the existence of a speculative trade to the presence of agents' diverse and ambiguous information.en
dc.identifier.citationpages35en
dc.relation.ispartoftitleTARK XIII : Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameACM
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityNew York
dc.relation.ispartofdate2011
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-1-4503-0707-9
dc.relation.conftitleTARK XIII
dc.relation.confdate2011-07
dc.relation.confcityGroningenen
dc.relation.confcountryPays-Basen


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