Properties and applications of dual reduction
Viossat, Yannick (2010), Properties and applications of dual reduction, Economic Theory, 44, 1, p. 53-68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0477-6
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameEconomic Theory
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Abstract (EN)The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows a ﬁnite game to be reduced to a smaller-dimensional game such that any correlated equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. We study the properties and applications of this process. It is shown that generic two-player normal form games have a unique full dual reduction (a known reﬁnement of dual reduction) and that all strategies that have probability zero in all correlated equilibria are eliminated in all full dual reductions. Among other applications, we give a linear programming proof of the fact that a unique correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, and improve on a result due to Nau, Gomez-Canovas and Hansen on the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria.
Subjects / KeywordsLinear duality; Dual reduction; Nash equilibrium; Correlated equilibrium; Théorie des jeux
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West, Jeffrey; Adler, Fred; Gallaher, Jill; Strobl, Maximilian; Brady-Nicholls, Renee; Brown, Joel S.; Robertson-Tessi, Mark; Kim, Eun Jung; Noble, Robert; Viossat, Yannick; Basanta, David; Anderson, Alexander R. A. (2022) Document de travail / Working paper