Abstract (EN)

Surprisingly, available elite studies on the EMU have mainly focused on the strategy of political elites in favor of uniting (Fligstein & Mara-Drita 1996 ; Jabko 2006), and Fligstein (2008) recently claimed there was still no real transnational business cohesive circle in Europe. This echoes a long-standing controversy on the existence of a transnational capitalist class or transnational business community (Robinson & Harris 2000; Sklair 2001; Morgan 2001; Carroll & Fennema 2002; Carroll & Carson 2003; Kentor & Jang 2004; Carrol & Fennema 2004; Nollert 2005; Kentor & Jang 2006; Carroll & Fennema 2006). In this paper, we try to clarify the debate for Europe, on the basis of an interlocking directorates study. We present a new theoretical framework for the study of transnational interlocking, a new context of reference (stock exchange indices rather than magazines’ rankings or international business organizations), and an original data-setting method (board composition at the end of the year for years 2006 and 2007). From this perspective, four main observations may be brought out. Firstly, unsurprisingly, national scores of centrality still remain much higher than transnational ones, what means the persistance of the national anchorage of core business elites. Secondly, the emerging transnational power based on transnational interlocks is based on the strength of weak ties, particularly around financial companies. Thirdly, the stronger transnational interlocks remain franco-German ones. This means that the centrality of this axis remains strong in Europe, what fits with other results for 2000 and 2003 presented by Guieu & Meschi (2008). Fourthly, we propose to take a tighter look to the Franco-Dutch interlocks in the context of economic restructurations in the Netherlands