• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • DRM (UMR CNRS 7088)
  • DRM : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • DRM (UMR CNRS 7088)
  • DRM : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards

Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith; Slovin, Myron; Sushka, Marie (2012), Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards, 2012 FMA European Conference, 2012-06, Istanbul, TURKEY

View/Open
Board_unitary_dual_2011.pdf (644.9Kb)
Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2012
Conference title
2012 FMA European Conference
Conference date
2012-06
Conference city
Istanbul
Conference country
TURKEY
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Belot, François
Théorie économique, modélisation et applications [THEMA]
Ginglinger, Edith
Dauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
Slovin, Myron
Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales [Carthage] [IHEC]
Sushka, Marie
Abstract (EN)
Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are likely to adopt dual boards. Firms well monitored by financial market and institutional forces are less likely to have dual boards. Our results imply that freedom of contract about board structure is valuable for shareholders.
Subjects / Keywords
monitoring; supervisory board; corporate governance; dual board; management board; unitary board; Board of directors
JEL
G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Reforming Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Choice between Unitary versus Dual Boards of Directors 
    Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith; Slovin, Myron; Sushka, Marie (2012) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Freedom of Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis 
    Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith; Slovin, Myron; Sushka, Marie (2014) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching 
    Ferreira, Daniel; Ginglinger, Edith; Laguna, Marie-Aude; Skalli-Housseini, Yasmine (2019) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching 
    Ferreira, Daniel; Ginglinger, Edith; Laguna, Marie-Aude; Skalli, Yasmine (2018) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Shareholder agreements and firm value: Evidence from French listed firms 
    Belot, François (2008) Communication / Conférence
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo