Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards
Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith; Slovin, Myron; Sushka, Marie (2012), Lessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards, 2012 FMA European Conference, 2012-06, Istanbul, TURKEY
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Conference title2012 FMA European Conference
MetadataShow full item record
Théorie économique, modélisation et applications [THEMA]
Dauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
Institut des hautes études commerciales (Carthage, Tunisie) [IHEC]
Abstract (EN)Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are likely to adopt dual boards. Firms well monitored by financial market and institutional forces are less likely to have dual boards. Our results imply that freedom of contract about board structure is valuable for shareholders.
Subjects / Keywordsmonitoring; supervisory board; corporate governance; dual board; management board; unitary board; Board of directors
Showing items related by title and author.
Reforming Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Choice between Unitary versus Dual Boards of Directors Belot, François; Ginglinger, Edith; Slovin, Myron; Sushka, Marie (2012) Communication / Conférence