Are evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory ? Some historical considerations
Schmidt, Christian (2004), Are evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory ? Some historical considerations, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14, 2, p. 249-262
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Nom de la revueJournal of Evolutionary Economics
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Résumé (EN)Evolutionary games really appeared in the field of economics at the beginning of the nineties. More than sixty years previously, V. Volterra published several papers on population dynamics which captured species evolution in a game-theoretical fashion. The second round of the history starts with J.F. Nash., who probably ignored E. Borel's works on games and took up his challenge. Nash's approach seems to reconcile Borel's and Volterra's approaches to a game situation. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a rational situation, by reference to a stable situation. In a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate.
Mots-clésJeux, Théorie des; Histoire économique; Économie évolutionniste
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