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dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-29T12:50:46Z
dc.date.available2012-06-29T12:50:46Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9661
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectJeux, Théorie desen
dc.subjectHistoire économiqueen
dc.subjectÉconomie évolutionnisteen
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleAre evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory ? Some historical considerationsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenEvolutionary games really appeared in the field of economics at the beginning of the nineties. More than sixty years previously, V. Volterra published several papers on population dynamics which captured species evolution in a game-theoretical fashion. The second round of the history starts with J.F. Nash., who probably ignored E. Borel's works on games and took up his challenge. Nash's approach seems to reconcile Borel's and Volterra's approaches to a game situation. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a rational situation, by reference to a stable situation. In a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Evolutionary Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol14en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2004
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages249-262en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie politiqueen


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